2nd Battalion Worcestershire Regiment in Burma 1944-45


CHAPTER 2

THE MARCH FROM THE CHINDWIN TO THE IRRAWADDY

 

We had been led to expect that we might be at Imphal for some time, but rather to our surprise orders to move came through before the middle of November, and about the 15th the Battalion, less the mules who moved by march route, left the camp at Mile 113 in M.T. on its way forward to Tamu, just over the Burma border, a small place that had changed hands several times during the past two years and which lay at the end of the metalled road from Imphal.

Tamu is situated in the notorious Kabaw Valley, sandwiched in between the Manipur plain on the West and the Chindwin valley on the East, from both of which it is separated by ranges of wild jungle-covered mountains. Malaria and typhus were rife in the valley, and the strictest precautions were necessary against both.
A brief outline of the plan of operations must now be given. The Japs had retreated in disorder during the monsoon months, leaving behind large quantities of stores and equipment, and these, together with the scores of skeletons to be found everywhere beside the tracks and roads, testified to the extent of the disaster that had overtaken their Army already. They were evidently on the run, and it was to be our job to keep up the pressure and continue the good work done by our predecessors. Already there were no very great Jap forces left. on the West bank of the Chindwin, except in the Kalewa area a good deal further South downstream than the stretch of river which we in 19th Division would have to cross, and these were even now being pushed back daily towards the river by their pursuers. in outline, the strategic picture was that a two-pronged thrust should be made across the Chindwin, by 19th Division in the Thaungdut-Sittaung area due East of Tamu, and by 2nd Division across the river at Kalewa. Our column would strike due East across the country to cut the main North-South Railway, down which the British 36th Division were now advancing from Myitkina. Later, we would swing South down the line of the railway itself, toward the plains, Shwebo, and Mandalay. Meanwhile, 2nd Division, after crossing at Kalewa, would make straight for Shwebo, striking South-East, down the road that General Alexander’s Army had used during the days of the Retreat in 1942.

But all this seemed very far ahead in November, for reports led us to believe that there were strong Jap forces in the thickly forested country East of the Chindwin, and progress was likely to be slow. Indeed, before we could even begin to think of crossing the Chindwin there was a good deal of work to be done improving the two very indifferent roads which we should have to use from Tamu to the River, and road-making was our first task. One road ran due East from Tamu across the 3000ft. mountain ridge to meet the river at Sittaung, a distance of about 35 miles, while the other took a slightly more northerly route and came out on the river near Thaungdut. Both these roads were at first required to be made up to tank-transporter standard, but later it was decided that no tanks would come in by our route and the standard was reduced to sufficient for 3-ton lorries.

On arriving in the Tamu neighbourhood, the Battalion immediately set to on the Sittaung road, which had been allotted to 64th Brigade, the Thaungdut road being given to 98th Brigade. 62nd Brigade were engaged in intensive patrolling across the Chindwin, and before long the whole Brigade was over in the Sittaung area, surprisingly enough unopposed. 1/6th Gurkhas from our own Brigade followed them. This left only the Baluch and ourselves to work on the road, and there was plenty to do. The Baluch were responsible for the Chindwin end of the road, while the Battalion was strung out at intervals from a point about 10 miles from Tamu to our junction, with the Baluch about halfway along the road. Bn. H.Q. was at Mile 16, high up on the crest of the jungle-covered hills dividing the Kabaw and Chindwin valleys.

While we were working on the road, patrols of 62nd Brigade found what had evidently been the main Jap L. of C. in this part of Burma, running East from the Chindwin. As this route began nearer Thaungdut than Sittaung, the road from Tamu to the former place became the main one for the Division, the Sittaung road being only used by 64th Brigade and such Sappers and ancillary units as we had working with us. This Jap L. of C. ran across very difficult country, hilly and densely forested, and sparsely inhabited, to Banmauk and indaw, where it joined the railway. Branches went off South to Pinlebu and thence to Wuntho and Kawlin, the last two on the railway some distance South of Indaw, and all important Jap communication centres on the route to Shwebo. It was a very bad track in places, but, as the wrecks of abandoned trucks along it showed, the Japs had somehow managed to get large quantities of M.T. along it, and it was one of the few through routes that existed at all. There was a second one, leading from the Chindwin South-East to Pi Lebu direct, shorter but worse than the Banmauk route, and along this 62nd Brigade began to advance, on an A.T. basis, toward the end of the month, meeting Jap rearguards of no great strength, while the rest of the Division prepared to cross and start off on the Northern route which it was to take. It was quickly becoming apparent that the Japs were not going to put up the resistance expected in the country immediately to the East of the Chindwin, and therefore the sooner we got on their heels the better. Work on the roads was therefore hurried forward as fast as possible, and the Battalion was only engaged on road-making for two weeks or so before orders were received that the rest of 64th Brigade would cross the river, join up behind the Gurkhas, and get under way. The Baluch, however, were sent up to join 98th Brigade on the Thaungdut road and crossed there a little later than the rest of us, joining up again after about a week. Just before the Battalion left its camps on the Sittaung road, Major Riddell left the Battalion and Major Tipler became acting Second-in-Command, Capt. Chapman (R. Warwicks) took over “A” Coy.

On 29th November the Battalion marched down to the Chindwin, a long and tiring march of some twenty miles, the first stage of a trek that was to take us right forward into the central plain of Burma in the next few weeks. We arrived at Sittaung early in the afternoon, and immediately began to cross the Chindwin, in a varied assortment of craft, from assault boats to rafts. By nightfall the Battalion was all across except for some transport and stores, and harboured for the night near the village of Mogaung, opposite Sittaung. Next day we resumed our march, and, all the Brigade Cp. except the Baluch being across, the L. of C. behind us was closed. From now on we were entirely dependent on Air Supply. The whole Division became air supplied once it had crossed the Chindwin. Any other method of maintaining so large a force in such country would have been impracticable, and it is no exaggeration to say that the success of the whole operation depended entirely on the Air Force, and they did their job magnificently. Rarely were we short of any essential supplies, and on the few occasions when the friendly Dakotas failed to appear, it was seldom due to any fault of their own.

On 30th November, the Battalion, with Bde. H.Q. and a Fd. Coy. of Sappers who had crossed with us, marched North up the East bank of the river with the Gurkhas one day’s march in front, and halted for the night near the village of Gwengu. Next day, December 1st, the advance continued, and the difficult obstacle of the Mu Chaung was crossed. This was a swift running stream, which defied all efforts to bridge it. M.T. had to be winched across and all stores rafted or man-handled. This was a slow business, and by evening all were still not across. One Coy. remained behind to protect the transport, etc., that was still on the South bank of the Chaung, while the rest of the Battalion and Bde. H.Q. formed a perimeter outside the village of Mauksapha, about a quarter of a mile beyond the Chaung.

Next morning the remainder of the transport crossed over without incident, and the advance continued, with the Gurkhas still a day or so ahead. On 2nd December we reached Maignwe, and on the 3rd Paungbyin, once a river port of some importance, but now a charred ruin, the result of our bombing while in Jap hands. Near Paungbyin the column rested for two days, enjoying the facilities for washing and bathing provided by a broad clear stream. Here also we had our first Air Drop, which was most successful.

On the 5th we left Paungbyin, and moved on to Nyaunggon, a small village on the edge of a large clearing in the forests, where the villagers were most pleased to see us, particularly as they were able to obtain gifts of cloth in the shape of parachutes used for dropping supplies. A large party turned out to assist in the construction of a Light Air Strip, which we made in case it should become necessary to evacuate any casualties. The Battalion perimeter was formed round the compound of the village Hpongyi Kyaung, or Monastery. These Kyaungs are conspicuous features of all Burmese towns and villages, with their ornate roofs and pagodas, and the yellow-robed monks who live in them. The Hpongyis have a somewhat sinister reputation, as a good many of them were actively anti-British in the days of the 1942 campaign, particularly in the towns, though the country Hpongyis are generally harmless enough, acting as the village schoolmasters. Their Kyaungs make convenient sites for camps, being shady and usually provided with good wells or tanks.

At Nyaunggon the Battalion split up for the first time since crossing the Chindwin, two Companies, “A” and “C,” being ordered to go to Sanda, a small place on the banks of the Chindwin, some miles to the North-West, where a Jap dump was believed to exist. They were also to recce. tracks in the area. The two Companies moved off under the Second-in-Command on the 6th, and reached Sanda without incident, but found little of interest there. They than proceeded inland once more and established themselves at Kamaing, six miles due North of the rest of the Battalion at Nyaunggan. They were there joined by the Pioneer Platoon, who did useful work improving the many small but difficult fords across the tracks.

On the 7th December, the remainder of the Battalion less “B” Coy., who remained at Nyaunggon to watch for Japs who might be using the tracks running East into the hills, moved through Kamaing and on to Le-U, where “A” Coy. and “C” Coy. joined up again. Brigade H.Q. remained with the Battalion as before. Le-U was on the main track forming the Jap L. of C. already mentioned, that started on the banks of the Chindwin near Thaungdut. It was a ruined and deserted village, like many of the others for miles around in this part of the country, the villagers having fled into the jungle or else been compelled by the Japs to go with them as porters and bullock-cart drivers. The Japs also demanded large quantities of rice, which the villagers could ill afford.

At Le-U we were joined by Capt. Whitmore, who, with a small rear party left behind at Mile 16, had gone round by way of Tamu, where a dump was made of such equipment and stores as it was impossible to take forward, and had crossed with the rest of the Division at Thaungdut. The 5/10 Baluch caught up with the Brigade again here too, and were followed by the remainder of the Division.

At this time it was intended that we should move East slowly, improving the track as we went, and indeed the 1/6 Gurkhas, who had already advanced far along the road without meeting any opposition, were ordered to halt. At Le-U work was commenced on an airstrip for Dakotas as well as the usual light airstrip. The Battalion moved out of Le-U on the 8th, and, with orders to begin road work once more, was again spread out at intervals along the road, Bn. H.Q. being a little short of the bombed and deserted village of Wetkauk, with Companies distributed along the road between there and Le-U. “B” Coy. came up from Nyaunggon to do their share of the work. Hardly had we started, however, when orders came through that, owing to the Jap retreat being carried out so much more quickly than had been expected, pursuit was to be begun immediately, and all frills like road improvement must be sacrificed for speed.

On the 9th, therefore, the Battalion moved on, the Companies behind catching up with the main body so that by nightfall the whole Battalion was concentrated at Naungmanna. The Gurkhas were a day ahead and the Baluch now only a day behind us, and this order of march was retained during the days that followed. The Gurkhas believed they were only about 24 hours behind the last Japs, so it was obvious that every effort must be made to catch up with them.

The most strenuous part of the whole march now began, the road becoming increasingly hilly and the days’ marches longer. On the 10th the Battalion reached Sinlamaung, a ruined and deserted village, on a stream called the Nam Tainggwin Chaung, at the foot of the 2000 ft. range that forms the watershed between the Chindwin and Irrawaddy rivers. Here again there was ample good water. Indeed, one of the pleasantest features of the whole of the first few weeks’ marching was the plentiful supply of good water at almost all the places we passed through. Later on, when the plains were reached, we looked back with regret to the days when at least there was no water problem. At Sinlamaung there were many signs that the Japs had only very recently left. Equipment and cooking utensils, some with fresh food still in them, were to be found lying about, also belts of clean new ammunition.

On the 11th, the Battalion set off at first light, and immediately the road began to climb steeply as it wound up and up on to the top of the hills. It was a most tiring day’s march, and it was with relief that, in the afternoon, we sighted the position that the Gurkhas had occupied the night before, although it was by no means an ideal one. There was little water available, for once, and what there was had to be man-handled in pakhals many feet up a precipitous hillside out of a ravine, since the slope was too steep for mules.

On the 12th, an early start was again made. The march turned out to be the longest and most tiring since the Battalion crossed the Chindwin. The distance was over twenty miles. Although the road followed the crest of the ridge, this consisted of a series of peaks and saddles the sides of which were steep, and the road climbed and fell in short steep pitches all the way. The final descent to the Nam Kadin Chaung, at the foot of the range on the East, was extremely difficult for vehicles, and it was not until it was getting dark that the last of the Battalion got into the perimeter, which was formed on the further bank of the Chaung.

Next day the march was again hills, but neither so long or so trying as that of the previous day. The Battalion arrived at Naungkut before mid-day, while the Gurkhas were still moving out, and there was ample time for everyone to bathe and wash their clothes in the excellent stream that ran just below our position.

We now heard that 62nd Brigade had got on well wit-h their advance on Pinlebu, now due South some 20 miles from where we were, and in spite of opposition were not far away from the town. it was therefore decided that we should send a patrol in jeeps down to Pinlebu to recce. the route from our direction, since it was the one that part of the Division following behind us would use, and see what Jap forces there might be in the neighbourhood. In addition, contact was, if possible, to be made with 62nd Brigade. Lieut. Bailey, of “A” Coy., was chosen for this task, and his patrol consisted of 8 men besides himself, with one man of the Burma Intelligence Corps (of whom there was a most valuable detachment working with the Battalion) to act as interpreter. They set off in three jeeps, and made their way down the West bank of the Mu River, which rises in the hills near Naungkut and eventually flows into the Irrawaddy, West of Mandalay. The tracks were not easy going for the jeeps, and eventually the patrol was held up at a ford a few miles North of Pinlebu itself, which 62nd Brigade had not yet reached. The patrol found mess tins of food still warm, left behind by the Japs, and locals told them that they were only four hours ahead of them. The, patrol returned to the Battalion after being out for two nights.

A second patrol under Lieut. Wright, also of “A” Coy, endeavoured to carry out the same task by a more easterly route, but the track proved to be very overgrown and quite impassable for vehicles. Although this patrol was out for three days, it only succeeded in covering 8 miles before it was compelled to return.
At this time the Battalion made contact with the Kachin Levies, an irregular force of hill men officered and armed by the Americans. They had been operating against the Japs on the right flank of 36th Division, coming down from the North. They informed us that aircraft that should have dropped supplies to us the day before had dropped them in error at a place 12 miles to the North, and accordingly “C” Coy. were sent off with a mule column to try to pick up some of these supplies. It was decided that the Kachins should move in front of us to act as a screen, but in fact they were soon overtaken and left behind.

At about this time Pinlebu was captured by 62nd Brigade, and they, followed by 98th Brigade and Divisional H.Q., continued their advance toward the next objective, Wuntho, important Jap base on the railway.

Meanwhile the Battalion, with Brigade H.Q., had moved on to Pinbon, a small village whose chief significance to us was that it saw us once more on something that could be called a road. This road runs from Indaw on the railway, West to Banmauk, a small town of some importance in a large clearing in the forests, and then North-West through Pinbon to Mansi, a forest centre for timber, where it ends. The Gurkhas were still ahead of the Battalion at Settaw, 3 miles short of Banmauk, and were still unopposed. “C” Coy. returned late that night, very tired, and having had little success. They were only able to locate and pick up a small proportion of the “drop,” which they brought back with them.

Next day the Battalion, with Brigade H.Q.,. moved up to Settaw and joined up with the Gurkhas, but not for long, as they moved out the next morning, on the last lap of the journey to the railway, about 30 miles off. We heard the following day that they had linked up with 36th Division, moving down the railway, and later two officers of their leading Brigade came over to make contact with us.
It was now time for 36th Division to turn East to the Irrawaddy, and for 19th Division to take up the advance down the railway. We should have the railway and such tracks as ran parallel to it as our axis of advance from now on all the way to Shwebo. It may be noted here that no through road from North to South exists in this part of Burma, the railway and the Irrawaddy being the two chief lines of communication. Thus such roads as do exist tend to run laterally from the main towns on the railway or river, and only run for short distances.

The initial plan was that the Gurkhas would push on East, to cut the railway a little South of Indaw, while we ourselves, with Brigade H.Q. and the Baluch following, would move down the tracks running parallel to the railway on the West, to cut it again at Nankan, some 30 miles from Indaw. It was hoped by doing this to surprise the Japs and cut off those who were still on the railway between Indaw and Nankan from their line of retreat.

The Kachin Levies whom we first Met at Naungkut had moved on ahead of us, but, with their unwieldy baggage train of elephants, bullock carts, pack animals and porters, they were unable to cover as many miles a day as we were, and on the 16th, when the Battalion marched from Settaw through Banmauk to Magyigon, a small forest village, we overtook them. We then learnt that they had nearly come to the end of their sphere of operations, the hill men of whom they were comprised being already a long way from their own territory and unwilling to go much farther. After Magyigon they moved off into the hills and we saw them no more.

An early start from Magyigon on the 17th brought the Battalion to Peinnebin early in the day, and again next day the Battalion completed the day’s march, to Shwedaung, before noon. At all these places water was plentiful and there was ample opportunity for washing.

There were now increased signs of recent Jap occupation, fires and refuse of food, etc., being very fresh, and it was obvious that only a few hours could separate us from the Jap rearguards. It was therefore decided that an attempt must be made to catch up with them by forcing the pace. Accordingly the Battalion received orders on the evening of the 18th to move off that night and occupy Nankan, some 12 miles ahead down quite a good road, on the 19th, if possible before first light. Unfortunately these orders were not received until shortly before dark, and little time was left for planning and issuing the necessary orders. The scheduled time for starting was 2300 hrs., but getting mules and ammunition issued out to Companies in the pitch dark and dense jungle was extremely difficult, and it was not until about midnight that the column finally moved off, with “A” Coy. in the lead, followed by Tac H.Q. and the Defence Pl., with ‘ C” Coy. behind them. The other two Companies were in rear. All Adm. stores and unnecessary personnel had, of course, been left behind at Shwedaung.

The C.O.’s plan was to move down side tracks to the East of the road so as to avoid being spotted, if possible. But the tracks turned out to be very bad, the night march was extremely slow, and eventually the Battalion found itself back on the main road once more, as it was just beginning to get light. The column had by this time become very strung out, and, “A” Coy. having missed the way once and thus lost its place at the head of the column, the march was now continued with the Defence Platoon in the lead. The C.O. decided to send” C “Coy. round to enter Nankan, now about two miles ahead, from the West, along the line of the railway, while he pushed on himself with the rest of the Battalion straight down the road. This movement began about 0900 hrs. Shortly afterwards, the Defence Platoon was ambushed when within a mile of Nankan, and suffered casualties. Two men were killed and Lieut. Baggott, the Platoon Commander, seriously wounded. “A” Coy. came to their assistance, and pushed very slowly on down the road, meeting slight opposition.

Meanwhile, “C” Coy. had advanced through the jungle and waded several chaungs. The leading platoon came into the West of the village and saw several Japs preparing food round a fire. Both sides opened fire, and one man of “C” Coy. was wounded. The Japs then ran away. “C” Coy. then moved on across the railway to the ultimate objective that had been given them, a track junction one mile South-West of Nankan. This they reached after brushing aside slight opposition and capturing a number of Jap packs hastily abandoned in a hut. The Company then established a firm base, and sent out a patrol under Lieut. Webb, to investigate a small village called Chaunggyi. This patrol had only gone a few hundred yards when it ran into an ambush consisting of 2 L.M.C.’s and a number of rifles. Lieut. Webb and Sgt. Knight were both killed. The patrol withdrew into “C” Coy.’s firm base. Later, under covering fire, the bodies were brought in and the wounded recovered. The Company then proceeded to dig in. At about 1 5Q0 hrs. two Jap officers and five coolies, the latter carrying baskets of provisions and talking loudly, were seen approaching “C” Coy. up the road. Fire was opened on them at short range. The two officers were killed and two coolies wounded. These latter were, however, able to run away with the rest. The bodies were brought in and two swords taken from them. These were the Battalion’s first trophies (These Swords are now in the Regimental Museum).

Meantime the rest of the Battalion had occupied the village of Nankan without further incident, and dug in not far from the railway station for the night. One platoon of the Machine Gun Battalion, 11th Sikh Regt., was in support. A platoon of “A” Coy. under Lieut. Gabb was sent out to reinforce “C” Coy. and remained with them for the night. At about 2200 hrs., a most unfortunate incident occurred on the main Battalion perimeter, in which two men of the Battalion who were on their way up from the Adm. area and had been delayed by their jeep breaking down, were fired upon and killed by the L.M.G.’s while approaching the perimeter after dark. This accident only served to emphasise the need for all ranks to observe with the greatest care the rule that no movement must take place outside the perimeter at night. It is only in exceptional circumstances in jungle warfare that there is any movement outside the perimeter at night, and unless specially notified men on the perimeter consider any movement outside at night to be hostile.
From Nankan the line of advance of the Brigade now lay East of the railway, down jungle tracks running almost due South through big teak forests. The rest of the Division had not followed us round through Banmauk, but had moved down to join 62nd Brigade after the capture of Pinlebu. From there ran the shortest route to Wuntho and Kawlin, important Jap bases on the railway, where good airstrips could be made and supply bases for our further advance set up. From there onwards the main axis of advance of the Division would be the railway, running straight down into the plains where lay the important town of Shwebo. All the Divisional Artillery went down to Pinlebu and we saw none of it. Our job was to form a flank guard on the East and our way would be through thick jungle down poor tracks all the way to Shwebo.

On 20th December the Battalion moved slowly forward, but the going was difficult and only about five miles had been covered before a halt was made for the night. There was no sign of any more Japs. The advance continued on the 2lst with the Battalion still in the lead, followed by the Baluch and the Gurkhas now in the rear. Again there was no opposition and the Battalion formed a firm base for the night by a small stream, which ran across the track. Orders came through, however, from Brigade in the evening for a night move. The object of this was to secure the village of Indet, which lay on an important road running East from Wuntho across our line of advance. 62nd and 98th Brigades had got on fast and captured both Wuntho and Kawlin, and the 2nd Welch Regt. of 62nd Brigade were at this moment fighting a strong Jap rearguard holding a position where the road ran through a gap in the hills a mile or so West of Indet. It might be possible to catch the Japs in the rear, if we could reach Indet quickly enough.

The Battalion started off during the night with local guides to show the way. Once again, however, they proved unreliable, as they had done before Nankan. In this case it is almost certain that they deliberately led the Battalion astray, whether through fear of Jap reprisals if they assisted us or from a genuine desire to help the enemy is a matter of conjecture—probably the former. The result naturally was that the Battalion was still some way from its objective at daybreak, and the last part of the move, which was over a broad strip of open paddy, took place in broad daylight. It was fortunate for us that there were no enemy in Indet. The villagers were all there, however, and turned out in force to see the troops come in. They were delighted later in the day when we had an Air Drop and they were thus able to obtain gifts of parachutes with their valuable material for clothes-making.

During the morning “C” Coy. were sent forward to occupy a steep rocky hill feature, largely bare of trees, which immediately overlooked the road. It was thought to be occupied by the Japs, and all preparations were made to support the attack by mortar fire should it be required, but the hill proved to be unoccupied, and “C” Coy. established themselves on it without incident. Evidently we were too late to catch the Japs who had been engaging the Welch the previous day, and who must have broken off the engagement during the night and slipped away. Below “C” Coy.’s hill feature the Battalion formed a firm base for the night. The Baluch and Brigade H.Q. also came up and joined us.

98th Brigade now took over the lead in the main advance of the Division down the railway, their next objective being the town of Kanbalu, a most important place between Kanbalu and Shwebo. 64th Brigade’s task was to form a flank guard on the East as already mentioned, and the Battalion moved off down a track running South from Indet early on the 23rd. No opposition was encountered and we formed a firm base on the Sinlin Chaung, a stream with a good flow of water. Here we spent Christmas Eve, and enjoyed the rest after a week of hard marching. Naturally we hoped that we should be allowed to spend Christmas Day there too, and there was much speculation as to the chances of the Christmas fare arriving from Kawlin, where it was being dropped by air. It was rather a disappointment, therefore, when we heard that we were to move next day, though it would obviously be foolish to let the Japs get ahead and give them time to prepare for us, and everyone realised that the decision to push on was a necessary one.

So, on the morning of the 25th, the Battalion moved off once more, though we were now no longer in the lead, the Gurkhas having passed through the day before. Just beyond the village of Wathegon, where the tracks were not very clearly defined, the Battalion unfortunately missed the route, and marched some miles down a track, which eventually faded, into the jungle. it was decided to strike across country Westwards, in which direction we now knew the correct track must lie. Movement was, however, very slow indeed, and the country broken and hilly. The mules had great difficulty in getting along at all, and with darkness falling the track we were looking for had still not been struck. The C.O. accordingly decided to halt for the night, and selected a deep ravine for the purpose. There was unfortunately no water to be had, and the animals were very thirsty. Patrols sent out in the last of the light found the track at last, but too late for it to be worth while to move again before dawn. Early next morning the Battalion moved off and reached the village of Nyaunggon by mid-day. Here we found the Q.M. and the M.T. already arrived, having not missed the route, and, best of all, they had the Christmas dinners prepared for us. As we had all had little to eat since breakfast the previous morning, everyone had a tremendous appetite, and the turkey and other delicacies went down very well indeed. So much so that some of us had reason to regret having eaten so much during the rest of the day’s march that followed, and which was further and more hilly than had been expected. At last the Battalion reached the village of Taungbon, and formed a firm base there.

The Gurkhas were advancing at a tremendous pace in front, still unopposed, and were 15 miles further on at Letpanda. On the 27th they advanced still further and occupied the village of Baw. We moved up to Letpanda, except for “D” Coy., who went on a few miles further to Zin, where Brigade H.Q. was established. Here in a large clearing with flat paddy fields, an airstrip was constructed and an A.D.S. set up.

Next day the Battalion, less “D” Coy., moved on and spent the next night at Baw. The Baluch now took the lead, and with the Battalion less “D” Coy.,” still at Zin, and “B” Coy., whom we left at Baw, following close behind, advanced to Hlwezeik. The village itself, which was astride a large dry chaung, was clear, but the Japs had left a small rearguard cleverly concealed on the edge of the jungle overlooking the chaung, and caused some casualties to a party of Sappers setting up a water point in a hole they had dug in the sand, before they were dispersed by the Baluch, who killed a number of them. Both Battalions went into a firm base together in the village, with a battery of Mountain Artillery (3.7’s), who had recently been sent up to join us from Division, the first artillery support we had had.

At Hlwezeik the Battalion remained for several days, less “B” Coy. at Baw and “D” Coy. who came up from Zin and were sent forward to a track junction a few miles beyond Hlwezeik. The Baluch moved on to the next village, Sabanatha, where again they had a small action with Jap rearguards, and halted there. The Gurkhas passed through once more, and took the village of Ngapyawdaing, some 10 miles farther on still. By this means all the villages and track junctions for a considerable distance from North to South were held, and it was hoped that we should catch some of the Japs who were reported to be retreating East and South-East after their defeat at Kanbalu on the railway, where the main force of the Division had a big engagement. The country, however, although the jungle was becoming less tall as the drier zone of Burma was approached, was still thick and intersected with innumerable small dry chaungs and paths, and any Japs who did retreat in this direction must have slipped through, as we caught none, in spite of intensive patrolling every day and many ambushes.

While we were at Hlwezeik, both 98th Brigade and 62nd Brigade had a good deal of fighting in the Kanbalu area, and the advance down the railway toward Shwebo was slowed down a lot. We were thus still at Hlwezeik on the 1st January. At this time Major Page was evacuated with typhus and Capt. Chapman also left us. Capt. Rigley took over “B” Coy. and Capt. Maycock “A” Coy.

On the 2nd we moved off once more, now the last of the three battalions of the brigade. On that day we reached Sabanatha, and on the 3rd Ngapyawdaing. On the 4th the Battalion caught up with the Baluch at Myemun, a large village on the important road from the railway at Zigon to the Irrawaddy at Male, a steamer station in peace-time. The great river had been running parallel with our advance for some time, but lately we had been getting closer to it, and it was now only some dozen miles away to our left flank. At Myemun a large firm base was formed, while the Gurkhas pushed on still farther South.

On 5th January units of 62nd Brigade began to arrive at Myemun, which was handed over to them, thus enabling the whole of 64th Brigade to continue the advance. The Baluch moved on to the village of Sainggaung, and the Gurkhas to Kongyi, on another important road from the railway at Kin-u to the Irrawaddy at Thabeikkyin, and only some 15 miles from Shwebo itself. We now heard that 2nd Division were also nearing Shwebo from the West, and our own 98th Brigade were threatening the town from the North.

At this moment the Battalion received orders to send two companies to Thabeikkyin. The C.O. chose “A” and “C” Companies for this task and they moved off under the Second-in-Command on the afternoon of the 5th. A small Pl. included the M.O., Capt. A. M. Ogilvie, R.A.M.C., and a Sapper party was also sent to assist in any recces. that might be made with a view to the possible use of Thabeikkyin as a crossing place when the time came to force the crossing of the river. In addition to making a detailed recce. of the Thabeikkyin area, the column was to destroy any Japs it found on the West bank of the river. Thabeikkyin itself is partially on the West and partially on the East tank From the East bank a. metalled road runs into the hills to Mogok, a diamond mine centre, and finally joins up with the Burma Road into China near Lashio.

The route the column took was a circuitous one, first up the Male track and then southwards through dense jungle by poor tracks to Thabeikkyin, They reached the village of Mezataw, not far from their objective, the same evening, without incident, and spent the night there. Next morning they continued their advance and at about 0800 hrs. caught their first glimpse of the Irrawaddy, which here runs in a deep valley the sides of which are covered in dense bamboo jungle, and is about half a mile wide. It is interesting to note that they were the first troops of the Division to reach the Irrawaddy. At a small creek about one mile North of Thabeikkyin the column halted, and formed a firm base for their transport. “A” Coy. then pushed on and surprised a party of Japs in the village itself, and accounted for two killed and one wounded, who was captured, but unfortunately died soon afterwards. Obtaining prisoners was always difficult. In the village a large dump of some 400 tons of rice and beans was found, in excellent condition. On the other bank of the river large numbers of Japs could be seen, and there was much noise of M.T.

A firm base was formed in the village during the afternoon. That night a party of Japs walked into the perimeter, and, on being attacked with grenades, fled, leaving their equipment behind. A number of valuable documents were found.

On the 7th, the column was relieved by two companies of the Welch Regt., and at 1700 hrs. started back to rejoin the Battalion, which was now at Kongyi. The route lay along a good track, so a night march presented no difficulties. At midnight the column halted for two hours’ rest, and at 0200 hrs. resumed the march. An hour later, the head of the column passed over a cross-tracks just outside the small village of Thinbaung. “C” Coy. were leading, with “A” Coy. in the rear, less one platoon under Lieut. Gabb, left behind to protect the transport, which was not to leave Thabeikyin until daylight. The rear platoon of the column was commanded by Lieut. Bailey. As this platoon was passing the cross-tracks, fire was opened up on it at point blank range with 2 L.M.G.’s and a number of rifles, The platoon was pinned down on one side of the track in some bushes, with the Japs only five yards away on the opposite bank. The slightest movement brought down heavy bursts of fire, and for three hours not a man of the platoon was able’ to move. There had been a number of casualties. With dawn approaching, Lieut. Bailey decided that an attempt must be made to get away at all costs before daylight revealed the men’s exact positions to the Japs, and he called out to them to make a dash for it when he gave the word. This they did, without further casualties. They had suffered, however, during the night four killed and two wounded, one seriously with a fractured thigh.

As soon as it was light the rest of the column, which had halted when the firing broke out in their rear, came to the platoon’s assistance. A platoon of “C” Coy. under Lieut. Walton did a wide outflanking movement and drove the Japs off, inflicting casualties on them. This attack was put in with great dash, and resulted in the immediate award of the Military Medal to Cpl. A. McGinty, while Lieut. Walton. received a Certificate of Gallantry.

After the action, the dead and wounded were recovered, and at about mid-day a firm base was formed while Lieut. Bailey took a patrol on to Kongyi to ask for an ambulance to be sent out if one was available. The transport came up under Lieut. Cabb during -the day from Thabeikkyin. The night was uneventful, but, since. no assistance had arrived by 9.0 o’clock next morning, the column set off for Kongyi, carrying on stretchers the wounded men and two others who were suffering from extreme exhaustion. The column reached Kongyi in the afternoon. They were by this time very tired, and had had no food for twenty-four hours. However, rest and food at Kongyi soon restored them, and the casualties were admitted to an M.D.S., which had by this time been set up in the village. Next day they set off to rejoin the Battalion at Minbe, and we must now turn back to the events which had been taking place with the rest of the Battalion since the two companies set off from Myemun at the start of the Thabeikkyin expedition.

The Battalion, less “A” and “C” Coys., left Myemun the morning after their departure, and reached Kongyi late in the evening as it was getting dark. The Baluch were now on the outskirts of Shwebo on the North-West, and were in contact with the Japs. They were the first troops to reach the town, the main column of the Division being some miles away to the North, up the railway. 2nd Division troops, however, were also very close to the town on the West, and were in contact with the enemy. The Gurkhas had moved on South from Kongyi, and were going to cut the main tarred and metalled road that runs East from Shwebo to the steamer station and ferry at Kyuaukmyaung on the Irrawaddy.

On the 7th, a day when we had the first rain since we crossed the Chindwin, and this was not sufficient to hamper our movement, the Battalion moved forward to Bodawtaw, a large village which the Gurkhas had occupied the previous day. Here Brigade H.Q. was established, and we found that the 4th Ind, Fd. Regt. had arrived. This was the first time we had had a Fd. Regt. with the Brigade since crossing the Chindwin. A mile beyond Bodawtaw, and still short of the road, the Gurkhas were in contact with the Japs retreating South-East toward the river at Kyuaukmyaung, and throughout the night the guns fired intermittently on the enemy positions in the village of Myothit. Next morning, however, it was found that they had withdrawn, and the village was empty. The whole place, however, was a shambles of dead and dying cattle caught in our shell fire, for the Japs had tied up all the cattle they could find before leaving, presumably to annoy the Gurkha troops to whom, of course, the cow is a sacred animal. During the morning there was some further skirmishing when the Japs tried to infiltrate back into the village, but they were soon driven out again. The Battalion was then ordered to hold the village with its own depleted strength augmented by one company of Gurkhas (Major Fenn), while the rest of that unit pushed on to place a block astride the main road. This they were able to do without incident.

In Myothit the Battalion made a grisly discovery. As the village was much too large to hold with the strength we had, the perimeter was formed round the Hpongyi Kyaung just outside it to the East, and here in a corner of the compound were lying the Mutilated bodies of four Burmese villagers, murdered by the Japs, presumably to prevent them from passing on information of their movements to our troops. Altogether Myothit was not a pleasant spot, and we were not sorry to leave it the next morning, the 9th, when units of 62nd Brigade took over. We moved off and by the evening were with the rest of the Brigade, less the Baluch fighting in Shwebo, beside the main road at the little village of Minbe. It was quite an excitement seeing a real tarred road again, the first we had seen since leaving Imphal in November. All reference to roads in this account up to this time has at best meant a good track or roughly metalled road, but nothing resembling a road in the English sense. Now, however, we had struck the first of the metalled main roads proper that run through central and southern Burma, though it may be said at once that these are always few and far between, and everyone raised a cheer as he stepped on to the tarmac for the first time. We were all in excellent spirits, not least because we had at last emerged from the jungle and the flat open paddy fields of the Shwebo plain stretched away to the South for miles, dotted with villages and intersected with canals.

“A” and “C” Coys. arrived at Minbe on the evening of the 9th, and were able to move out with the rest of the Battalion next day. The move was down the road toward Shwebo, and a firm base was established at the village of Mingyaung, 4 miles to the East of the town, before mid-day without incident. On this day, the 10th, the Baluch entered Shwebo in the face of opposition, and linked up with the 7th Battalion Worcestershire Regt. (2nd Division), who had entered the town from the West at the same time.

It was now considered possible that the Japs withdrawing South from Shwebo, which was not defended as strongly as we had expected, might be caught if we could get a force round behind the town on that side quickly enough. Accordingly the Gurkhas were sent off to occupy a large village to the South-east of Shwebo, while we were ordered to move, with two companies only, to Padaung, a village on the Moksogyon branch canal, which runs southwards from Shwebo and has a good though unmetalled road running beside it. The C.O. decided to take “B” and “D” Coys., and these, with Bn. H.Q., left Mingyaung early in the afternoon. “A” and “.C” Coys. remained with Brigade H.Q. at Mingyaung. Padaung was reached without incident. “D” Coy. was sent to search a village a little farther down the Canal and fired a few shots at a small party of Japs who ran away, but it was evident that we had missed the main body of the Japs, who, according to the villagers, had passed through the night before.

On the 12th, the Battalion received orders to move further round to the South-west and cut the main Shwebo-Mandalay road at the village of Bonbwet, some three miles from Shwebo itself, This was accomplished without mishap, though there were a few moments of unpleasant suspense when some Jap aircraft flew low over our heads as we moved over the open paddy, and the mule column scattered for safety, Fortunately for us the aircraft were bound for the airfield that had been opened for Dakotas near Shwebo, and we were not molested. Incidentally, this was one of the very few occasions when we saw Jap aircraft at all, so complete was the R.A.F. mastery of the air.

The Battalion had only been in Bonbwet a couple of hours when the 1st Bn. Royal Scots Fusiliers (2nd Division) came down the road from Shwebo and took over from us. We then received orders to return to Padaung, which we did, and were there joined by the other two companies from Mingyaung. This finished 64th Brigade’s job in the Shwebo area, and all three Battalions had a short rest. 2nd Division took up the running down the main Mandalay road, and 62nd Brigade pushed on East down the road to Kyuaukmyaung, in the face of fairly stiff opposition.

On the 13th, while we were at Padaung, the 7th Battalion passed through on their way down the Moksogyon Canal road, and we were able to stage a small re-union with them. They halted for a few hours at Padaung, and we turned out a representative Guard of all Companies in their honour. The officers were entertained to lunch in the Bn. H.Q. compound, where a large table spread with white parachutes had been set up for the occasion. A 14th Army reporter attended the party and took a number of photographs. He also interviewed representatives of both Battalions. Altogether it was a pleasant but all too short interlude.

It was by now common knowledge that in the coming drive on Mandalay our role in 19th Division would be to cross the Irrawaddy in the Kyuaukmyaung area and push down the East bank of the river toward the city, while 2nd Division advanced straight down the main road to cross in the neighbourhood of the Ava bridge arid approach the city from the West. Mandalay itself, as a glance at any map will show, stands on the East bank of the river just above the great bend where the Irrawaddy turns West for many miles before once more resuming its southward course to the sea.

By the 14th January, 62nd Brigade had practically cleared the road as far as the West bank of the river, and accordingly 64th Brigade began to concentrate in the area West of Kyuaukmyaung in preparation for the crossing, which was to take place as soon as possible. 98th Brigade were made responsible for cleaning up in the area along the river bank between Kyuaukmyaung on the South and Thabeikkyin on the North, and were also to form a subsidiary bridgehead in the Thabeikkyin area, This kept them very busy, and they had a lot of fighting during the time we were fighting our bridgehead battle opposite Kyuaukmyaung, but it was the Kyuaukmyaung bridgehead that was the really important one, and it is with it that this account is concerned.

On the 14th the Battalion left Padaung and marched East across country to the village of Gyogya, where we remained until the 16th. The beer ration for the month came up and: was most welcome, but it had to be drunk with some haste as we moved up to our concentration area for the crossing on the evening of the 16th. That night found the Battalion hidden in the dense bamboo jungle once more, about a mile from Kyuaukmyaung, and preparations for the crossing began in earnest.

Thus the first part of the campaign was concluded, and the long march from the Chindwin to the Irrawaddy had been accomplished, a phase in which there was more hard foot-slogging than actual fighting, but which was a test of endurance all the same. Since the 29th November, when the Battalion had its camps on the Sittaung track, it had marched over three hundred miles, and some companies nearer four, much of it over very difficult country. This was not a bad performance, and we all felt justifiably proud of ourselves.




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