CHAPTER 7
THE OPERATIONS ON THE SHAN STATES ROAD
The Battalion stayed the night of 3/4 April near the Myitgne River, and arrived to join Brigade H.Q. and the Baluch late in the afternoon of the 4th, at the village of Pyintha, six miles from Meiktila. With us were 4th Indian Field Regt. The enemy were some two miles further down the road, covering the town 0f Thazi, a junction on the Rangoon-Mandalay railway, which was our first objective. The country here is very bare and open, and nearly flat. S.W. of Thazi lies the Minhia Tank, a big sheet of water which effectively prevents any approach being made to the town on that side. The road runs into Thazi from the West, alongside the branch railway from Thazi to Meiktila. Both these cross a Chaung running into the Minhia Tank, and patrols reported that the bridges were blown and the road mined. It looked, therefore, as if any attack on the town must be made from the North side of the road. Here low ridges afforded possibilities of defence and it was considered that the Japs would hold these, as indeed they did. It was essential for them to gain time, as many of their troops had been cut off by the rapidity 0f the advance and were still trickling down from the country North and North-West of Thazi. The 1/6 Gurkhas had been sent off from Wundwin to deal with these Japs, and they were to join up with the rest of the Brigade on the Samon Chaung some miles beyond Thazi, to the East.
On 6th April the Baluch were in the lead, and were in occupation of the village of Segyi, just North of the road, with patrols out in front in contact with the enemy. The Japs were holding the villages of Katke-in and Kanzwe, on the low ridges N.W. of Thazi, in some strength. They had a few guns, and there was a little shelling of Segyi, but nothing serious. An attack by the Baluch was planned, and the Battalion moved into Segyi with Brigade H.Q. and 4th Indian Field to assist if required.
The Baluch attack took place on the 8th. It was considered possible that they might get further than the two villages if there was no very strong opposition, and might be able to occupy Thazi itself. Accordingly the Battalion was ordered to provide two companies to follow up the Baluch and take over the villages once they had been taken, to enable the advance to go on unchecked. As it turned out, the opposition was very determined, and it was not until late in the day that Kanzwe, the second village, was captured. The Baluch were very tired after their hard day’s fighting, and it was therefore arranged that our two companies should hold the two captured villages, while they were withdrawn to Segyi. “B” Coy. was put into Katke-in and “A” into Kanzwe. The night that followed was quiet.
Mopping up in Meiktila
Major Tipler once again took over as Second-in-Command, and Capt. Kendrick took over “B” Company.
At Segyi, a Battalion of West Yorks. of 5 Division from Meiktila took over from such of the Battalion as was still there. The Baluch moved out and pushed on through Thazi, which was deserted and so badly ruined that only a few walls were left standing in the whole town. At the village of Ywamuntha, two miles beyond Thazi, a small party of Japs held them up and caused a few casualties before they were dispersed. Late in the afternoon the Battalion was ordered to relieve the Baluch, who withdrew into Thazi. We went into a perimeter just outside Ywamuntha, beside the road. Patrols were at once sent out to investigate the surrounding villages. There was some excitement when a Jap officer was found that evening still hiding in Ywamuntha and killed.
The Battalion set off early on the morning of the 11th, and met with no opposition until the neighbourhood of the Samon Chaung itself was reached. The road and railway cross it close together in a belt of thick scrubby country where visibility is poor. in this area the Japs had a rearguard position manned, and “ D” Company, who were in the lead, were soon held up. A day of confused fighting followed. Control was very difficult and it was hard to know exactly where everyone was and what was happening. Late in the afternoon the position was still not cleared, and the Battalion was ordered to fall back on the village of Kyabetkon, a short distance back on the road. It took some time to get the casualties out and disengage, but a perimeter was formed in Kyabetkon before dark. Our casualties included Lieut. Lund (“ D” Company) killed. The whole Battalion was very exhausted, as they had been fighting all day in terrific heat. The thermometer now reached about 107 degrees in the shade at mid-day, and such thunderstorms as did occasionally occur served only to increase the humidity without cooling the air.
Patrols to the Samon Chaung on the 12th showed that the Japs had withdrawn. “B “and” C “ Companies were at once despatched to form a firm base at the bridge. Armoured cars then patrolled beyond and found the village of Hlaingdet full of Japs. Next day the Baluch advanced and captured Hlaingdet in the face of opposition. The bulk of the Jap force was, however, obviously pulling back fast into the hills, leaving only strong rearguards behind to delay us at suitable places.
The Battalion reached Zibindwin without incident, but was subjected to an unpleasant dose of shelling while digging in there. The Japs had an O.P. on the Payangazu ridges not very far away, and the clouds of dust raised by the movement of men and animals gave them an excellent idea as to where we were. The gunners who were with us suffered some casualties. Next morning there was more shelling, and some further casualties.
From Zibindwin we sent out patrols by night to find out if the Japs were in Payangazu, and if possible to occupy the features known as Slap and Tickle on either side of the road. They reported that there were many Japs in and around Payangazu, and that they had been unable to gain their objectives.
It was decided to make another attempt, this time by day. Two platoons went out, one from “A” Company (Lieut. Gabb) and one from “C” Company (Lieut. Overton). Their objectives were the Northern and Southern features respectively. Lieut. Gabbs platoon succeeded in climbing on to Tickle, the Northern feature, by making a big detour to the North, and established themselves on it. They were, however, unable to make much progress along the ridge to the spur immediately looking down on the defile, which was called Thurso, the Japs being established there among a cluster of pagodas. This partial success was reinforced when the rest of ‘A” Company moved up to the ridge. Further attempts were then made to take Thurso, but without success. The Company suffered severely from the heat, which was worse than ever, and from shortage of water. All water for them had to be carried up by parties of men taking a long roundabout route. A number of men became casualties due to the heat, and these included Lieut. Holloway; difficulty was experienced in evacuating the casualties.
It was now clear that a full-scale attack would be necessary to capture the position, and it was decided that the Battalion should take the Northern side of the defile first, while the Gurkhas would attack the Southern side once we had secured our objectives.
The Battalion moved up to Pyangazu village on the 16th. The Japs had withdrawn from this once “A” Company occupied the ridge behind. “A” Company had been able to dislodge the Jap O.P. on Tickle, so we were spared further shelling. “D” Company now took over from “A” Company.
The attack was timed to start at 0700 hrs. on 17th April, and an airstrike on Slap by Mitchell bombers was to take place at 0730 hrs., to assist 1/6 Gurkhas in their attack. On our side of the defile our men were too close to the enemy to make an airstrike in our support possible. “C” Company were detailed for the task 0f taking Thurso, and they moved up on to Tickle and along the ridge through D Company. A concentration of artillery was put down round the pagodas where the Jap positions were situated, but this did not have much effect. Most of the enemy trenches were just behind the crest of the ridge where they could not be touched. Two attempts were made by “C” Company to take the position, but both were held up just short 0f the pagodas. The airstrike had come in on Slap by this time, and was extremely accurate, but it did not look as if the Gurkhas would derive much benefit from it as, until we had captured Thurso, they could not begin their assault.
It was now decided to make a third attempt, this time combining “C” Company’s advance along the ridge with a move by “B” Company across the open ground in front of the ridge from the West. This attack proved most successful. The enemy were again ready for “C” Company, but the arrival of “B” Company from an unexpected direction took them by surprise, and they fled. The M.M.G.’s, who had toiled up to “D” Company’s position on the top of Tickle, had a magnificent shoot on the enemy as they retired at the double down the reverse slope. Our casualties were not heavy, but included Lieut. Griffiths, “C” Company, who was seriously wounded.
“B” Company established themselves on Thurso for the night, while “D” remained on Tickle. “C” Company were withdrawn into reserve.
This was the last action the Battalion fought for some time, 19 Division was now relieved of responsibility for the Shan States Road, and troops of 36 Division took over from us. They had been clearing the Burma Road area with Chinese and American troops after crossing the Irrawaddy at Katha, soon after they linked up with us at Indaw in the early stages of our advance. The Battalion moved back to the village of Shwedokkon near Zibindwin, and two days later, on the 19th April, we moved back into Meiktila by M.T. for a short rest. While the Battalion was at Shwedokkon, we were paid a short visit by General Sir Oliver Leese, Commander Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia.
During this time the Column pressing down the Rangoon road had made spectacular progress, and was now already beyond Toungoo, 180 miles to the South. 19 Division was assigned the task of mopping up at various points along the road, and it was expected that we should eventually concentrate at Toungoo, in readiness for further tasks. With this in view, the Animal Transport of the Battalion left Meiktila, with “B” Company as escort, on the 26th, to march down the road by easy stages.
On May 2nd we heard that Rangoon had fallen, but there was still much to do. A large force of Japs was still concentrated just East of Toungoo, a big town and starting point of a second road into the Shan States. Most of 19 Division was sent down to begin a push up this road, and this was shortly under way. The fighting, as it turned out, was some of the most bitter the Division had during the whole campaign. It did not, however, affect 64 Brigade. But we were not to be left idle for long. 36 Division were due for relief, having been longer in Burma than anyone else, and someone had to take over from them. This task fell to 64 Brigade.
General Sir Oliver Leese (left)
The C.O. returned in the evening and we learnt what the position was. It was not by any means as satisfactory as we could have hoped. There were some four Battalions operating up the road, together with a strong contingent of Sappers, and there was plenty of Artillery support. The advance had been carried out in the face of opposition and numerous demolitions, and the leading troops, of the R.S.F. and R.W.F., were held up at the foot of the very strong natural defensive position known as the Staircase, where the road zig-zags up out of the valley of the Magwe Chaung on to the 3000 ft. ridge leading up to Kalaw itself. The L. of C. behind them was long and ill-protected, and ran through thick teak forests and deep gorges with many dangerous defiles. At Kywedatson, not far beyond Payangazu, and again at Pyinyaung, 20 miles further on, there were bad diversions where bridges had been destroyed over big chaungs. At any time these might become impassable owing to heavy rains.
On May 9th the Battalion left Pyintha in M.T. early in the morning, and moved up to take over its new role. “D” Company were dropped off on the way at the big defile between Pyinyaung and Kyatsakan, to patrol this area, and the remainder of the Battalion went on to Nampandet. Next day we receed. the R.S.F. and R.W.F. positions, and companies were detailed to take over from them, “A” Company the forward position on the road itself at the bottom of the Staircase, and “C” Company the position on the top 0f the spur to the East, some thousand feet higher up, which the R.S.F. s had with difficulty established, and which was maintained with difficulty by manhandling stores up the almost perpendicular mountain-side, which was far too steep, slippery, and thickly covered in jungle for mules to get up. The Companies took over without incident on the 9th. That the relief of the hill position was not disturbed was a piece of good fortune. Since it provided a base from which our patrols could probe the upper portion of the Staircase area, and represented the greatest threat yet made to the Jap position, it was naturally the object of much enemy attention once it was discovered, and was constantly shelled and mortared from the Jap positions further up the road. Any movement on the Company position could be seen by Jap 0.P.’s on the higher points overlooking it, and carrying parties were usually shelled and mortared as they came over the crest of the ridge. Casualties were frequent.
Bn. H.Q. and “B” Company moved up from Nampandet about 1 mile on the 11th, and again next day to a position astride the road a mile or so behind “A” Company, and directly below “C” Company’s position high on the ridge above. Here the hill rose so steeply that the position could not be shelled, nor could it be seen by the Japs from any of their O.P.’s. This was a great advantage. At Nampandet, and anywhere along the road above and below for a considerable distance, there was constant harassing fire.
While we were in these positions, the Battalion sustained a heavy loss in the departure of the Commanding Officer, Lt.-Col. Symes. He had not been very fit for some time, and it was necessary for him to return to a less arduous task in India. He had set a fine example to all ranks throughout the campaign, and the Battalion owed much of its success to his command. Major Mander Jones became C.O. in his place. Major Tipler once again became 2 i/c. Capt. Walton took over “C” Company.
Since we were so weak in strength compared with 36 Division, a static period followed of necessity, during which the Gurkhas arrived at Pyinyaung, and work on the bridges was pushed forward by the Sappers at the greatest possible speed. On the 15th the Battalion changed places with the Baluch, and moved back to Nampandet. This move was not carried out without incident. The M.T. was shelled on the road, and there were casualties, including the Pioneer Sjt., Sjt. Langhorn, who was killed.
The Japs were not wasting their time, and seeing that we were apparently unable to press the pursuit, they decided to hold on to the Staircase position longer than they had probably at first intended. At any rate, they brought up reinforcements and more guns, and our patrols reported that they were being energetic in improving their positions, which now extended in depth along the road. A long-range patrol, however, reported on the 17th that Kalaw itself was apparently nearly empty, but guarded by outposts on the hills surrounding it.
Guerillas reported to us that the Japs had re-occupied a group of villages in the hills to the East of the road behind us, thus threatening further the L. of C., and a party of Japs did actually attack a guerilla camp not far from “ D” Company’s position at Kyatsakan on the morning of the 19th. They were driven off with casualties, “D” Company’s 3inch Mortars having a particularly successful shoot. However, the threat remained, and there appeared to be no reason why parties of Japs should not cut the road at any time. Patrols were sent out daily at first light to open the road, and intensive patrolling of all side valleys and tracks by which the Japs might approach was instituted.
At this time we heard that at last a much needed fourth Battalion was arriving to assist in L. of C. protection, thus freeing the Gurkhas to take part with the rest of the Brigade in an attack on the Staircase. This battalion was the Chin Hills Bn., composed of hill men who were ideally suited to long-range patrolling and “watch and ward in this difficult hilly country. As soon as they arrived, the 1/6 Gurkhas handed over to them, and came up to join the Brigade near Nampandet. It was now possible to plan an attack on the Staircase. We were thankful to be leaving the Nampandet area, as the constant shelling and inaction were becoming very irritating.
The plan for the attack was as follows. The 1/6 Gurkhas, working on an entirely manpack basis, were to move up the Magwe Chaung for some distance and then climb the extremely steep ridge to the East so as to come down on the road at about the 55th milestone, well in rear of the Jap position on the Staircase, which was centred on the bluff called the Hump, just below the village of Wetpyuye, at about mile 49. When they had done this, the Baluch would attack the Hump position from along the ridge where the forward company position had been ever since we took over from 36 Division. After Hump was captured, and the zig-zag stretch of road below it cleared, they would clear the road up to the village of Yeyaungma, toward which the Gurkhas would work from the other direction coming down from Mile 55. To assist in closing the gap, 2 Worc. R., who provided Brigade reserve, were to establish one company on the commanding feature known as Beetle, overlooking the village of Yeyaungma and the stretch of road between miles 51 and 53. This feature lay on the opposite side of the road to Yeyaungma, from which it was divided by a deep chaung over which the road crossed three times by bridges, which it was almost certain, had been blown.
On the evening of the 5th, also, our own “A” Company, under Major Ellis, set out also on a manpack basis to scale Beetle from the North. Their route lay up the Huba Chaung for some distance, and then straight up the side of the mountain. It was no small, feat getting up at all, laden as the men were, but they reached the Northern end of the ridge leading up to Beetle by dusk, well ahead of schedule, and after spending the night concealed there, occupied their objective at first light without opposition. They then dug in and patrolled the area. It was unfortunate that the forest here was even thicker than had been expected and little could actually be seen from the top of the hill, but at least the position would serve a good base for striking at the enemy if the Baluch attack caused the enemy to retire that way.
As it turned out, however, the Japs withdrew by forest tracks South of Yeyaungma, and the company did not have any fighting. The Baluch attack, which was preceded by a heavy concentration of Artillery, including Mediums specially brought up to Nampandet for the purpose, took all day and was successfully completed by the afternoon, but not without very considerable casualties. The Baluch formed a perimeter in Wetpyuye and we sent up “C” Company to garrison Hump. This position provided a panoramic view of the whole Magwe Chaung valley, and had it been held by a force of any size would have taken weeks to take.
Contact was speedily made with the Gurkhas, and it was then a question of pushing ahead at once with repairing the scores of demolished bridges and culverts every few hundred yards along the road so that communications could be restored and the last stage of the advance on Kalaw be carried out. In the face of constant setbacks through heavy rain blocking the diversions they had constructed, the Sappers worked all out and soon had the road passable for M.T. and 25-pounders. The Battalion marched up to the Gurkhas’ camp near Mile 55 on the 8th, the detached companies rejoining the same day.
It now appeared that the Japs were pulling out altogether, and touch with them was lost. It was therefore decided that the Battalion should push on up the road the next day and if possible enter Kalaw. Accordingly we set off, less “D” Company, who were left behind on L. of C. duty, early on the morning of the 9th.
It was considered that if the Japs were going to make a further stand this side of Kalaw, they would probably do so at the zig-zag at about Mile 57, above the village of Yeya, which was known as the Little Staircase. Here the road, after following up the bottom of a fairly level valley, started to climb up the side among pine forests, and then wound round following the contours of the hillside and steadily mounting all the way to the outskirts of Kalaw, 3 miles further on. When the Little Staircase was passed without opposition, and “B” Company, who were in the lead, had reached Mile 58, we began to hope that we were going to reach Kalaw unmolested. However, at this moment a number of Jap M.M.G. ‘s on the ridge lying the opposite side of the valley to the road opened up on the column, which was extremely exposed and without cover from that side, and at the same time “B” Company were engaged by a party of the enemy high on a ridge overlooking the road from the right. The advance was held up and casualties were caused to troops of the column on the road. Among others, Major Ellis, of “A” Coy., who was at Bn. H.Q. at the time, was wounded by M.G. fire, and enemy mortar fire also did some damage. We had with us half a squadron of 25 Dragoons (Sherman tanks), who had done good work in support of the Baluch at the Staircase a few days previously, and they now came into action, swinging round on the very narrow road to bring their weapons to bear. They soon silenced the enemy M.M.G.’s, but it was considered inadvisable for the column to continue moving up the road, so while “B” Company and the tanks were ordered to continue the advance up the road, the rest of the Battalion moved back round the spur at about Mile 57½ and re-organised there before trying another line of advance. In a deep re-entrant at the side of the road we left the animals and a small escort, while the rest of the Battalion, with “C” Company in the lead, set off to climb on to the ridge to the West of the road. The intention was to follow the crest of the ridge through the pine forest keeping parallel to the road, and if possible by-pass the enemy position.
The advance proceeded without opposition except from a few snipers, who were brushed aside, until the leading troops were a few hundred yards from the Cemetery, which lies on the outskirts of the more open ground surrounding Kalaw. Here “C” Company ran up against a well dug-in Jap position covering the only possible approach, and the advance came to a stop.
Meantime “B” Company and the tanks had reached Mile 59, which lay about level with the Cemetery, but, of course, a long way down the hillside below it, and here they were held up by a blown culvert, which the tanks could not cross. They set to and began to fill the gap in, but before the work had been completed they were fired upon once more by the M.M.G. ‘s which had been so troublesome earlier in the day, and which had moved further back along the ridge opposite the road across the valley, after being dislodged by fire from the tanks. This time it proved impossible to locate them accurately and the advance was held up completely. It was decided that the advance would not be able to be continued until the ridge on which the M.M.G.'s were situated was cleared, and as it was now too late in the afternoon for this to be begun, the Battalion was ordered to disengage and occupy a position on the ridge some 300 yards behind the point where “C” Company were held up, for the night.
Orders were sent out to the companies to this effect, but “B” Company had the greatest difficulty in getting their wounded away under the M.M.G. fire, and eventually the casualties were brought out by the tanks. During this operation the Squadron Commander of the 25 D.C. was seriously wounded and died shortly afterwards. “B” Company reached the Battalion perimeter as it was getting dark.
The 1/6 Gurkhas came up to the place where we had left our mules during the morning and here an Administration base was formed. Next day both we and the Gurkhas patrolled extensively. Otherwise, apart from a jitter party at dawn, the day was quiet. There was a little very inaccurate enemy shelling from guns located away beyond Kalaw. The most remarkable result of the day’s patrolling was that the Cemetery position was found to be abandoned, and we established a standing patrol there. The position, though not large, was very strongly made with elaborate bunkers, and it was difficult to see why the enemy should have evacuated it unless he was really clearing out from Kalaw. Next day, therefore, the whole of “D” Company went out to investigate the Western approaches to the town, and returned later with the information that there were no enemy in the vicinity. It was therefore decided to move into Kalaw next day.
The plan for the occupation of Kalaw involved both the 1/6 Gurkhas and ourselves. While they moved along the ridge, which had held the M.M.G.’s two days before, and entered the town from the North, we were to split into two. “C” Company were to move up the road with the tanks, in the same way as “B” Company had in the previous attempt, and the rest of the Battalion on an A.T. basis was to make a wide detour to the West and come in from that side.
This operation started early on the morning of the 12th and was carried out according to plan and unopposed. By early afternoon the Battalion was established and digging in on the Western outskirts of Kalaw, while patrols searched the large and scattered cantonment where lay the European houses of the hill-station, South of the Bazaar. We were greeted by a number of European internees, who had been threatened and bullied by the Japs, but not physically ill-treated. They had, however, lived almost entirely on rice for the last three years, and were overjoyed to be given bread and other European food, which they had almost forgotten the taste of. We arranged for them to be given military rations until their evacuation could be arranged.
In the days that followed, the Japs pulled right back, in the direction of Taunggyi, capital of the Shan States, 50 miles away to the East, and also South down a road which branches off the Taunggyi road near Aungban, a small town 9 miles from Kalaw. We were able to patrol for a long way East, well beyond Aungban, and only down the road South did the Japs show any sign of stopping their withdrawal. There were some small patrol clashes and a little inaccurate shelling by the enemy, but otherwise nothing of note occurred.
Within a week, we heard that we were to be relieved by another Division, and were to go down to Pyimana for a short rest before taking our turn with the other Brigades of the Division, who, as has already been mentioned, had during this time been fighting up the second road into the Shan States, known as the Mawchi road, which starts from Toungoo. On this road fighting had been much heavier than anything we had experienced on the way up to Kalaw, and only about 25 miles had been covered.
The advance party left Kalaw on the 19th, spent the night in a staging area at Thazi, and reached Pyinmana the next afternoon. Major Tipler, who was once more acting Second-in-Command since the departure of Lt.-Col. Symes, was in charge of the party. We found we were to be billeted in a large building that had been a College of Forestry on the outskirts of the town. This building had been much damaged by bombing and shelling, and a lot of work was required to make it weatherproof. The party had plenty to do before the arrival of the Battalion toward the end of the month. The A.T. were sent off from Kalaw before the rest of the Battalion travelled to Meiktila by M.T., and then marched down the Rangoon road to Pyinmana by stages, for the second time, arriving on the 28th.
After a period of a few weeks at Pyinmana, the Battalion was sent further down the road to Pyu, a town between Toungoo and Pegu, and lying on the stretch of road across which there were still remnants of the Jap force trapped in the hills of the Pegu Yomas to the West trying to cross and make good their escape. These parties of enemy were in the last stages of exhaustion and were able to put up little resistance. In the course of a few weeks the Battalion accounted for about 70 killed and 20 P.O.W., for no casualties suffered at all. This occupied us until the end of the war, and made a successful conclusion of the campaign as far as we were concerned.
By the end of August, the Battalion was back at Pyinmana, where we were able to make a gradual return to peacetime routine.
During the course of the campaign the Battalion had suffered casualties amounting to approximately 80 killed and 200 wounded, in addition to which there was a considerable toll from sickness. We had, however, inflicted very much heavier casualties on the Jap, and it was a satisfaction to have taken part in a campaign in which the inferiority of the Jap Army had at last been proved, and their defeat been complete.