|
|
|
However, as they
approached it they found their way blocked by Captain Daniel Cadoux of the
95th Rifles. The French were left with little choice but to attack Cadoux
and his small party of men whom the French thought would take little
brushing aside. In the event, Cadoux held on for two hours, inflicting 231
casualties on the French including Vandermaesen himself, who was killed.
Whilst the fighting was in progress Cadoux sent repeated requests to
General Skerrett, acting commander of the Light Division and who was aware
of the action, but he did nothing, otherwise the whole of the French
division might have been forced to surrender. No support was given to
Cadoux and finally the 95th were forced to give way. The brave Cadoux was
killed along with sixteen of his men while three other officers and 43 men
were wounded. With the withdrawal of the 95th the French were able to gain
the safety of the opposite side of the river. There was no let up in
the Allied operations following the fall of San Sebastian. The winter
rains were due and Wellington was anxious that his army get as far into
France as was possible before the condition of the roads became too bad.
At dawn on October 7th Wellington's army crossed the Bidassoa, the first
of a series of rivers that had to be negotiated by Wellington's army
before he could push on into the heart of France. Waiting to guide the
British troops across were some local shrimpers who led the men out across
the river which, in spite of its wide estuary, came up only as far as the
men's waists at most. The audacious crossing caught the French by surprise
all the way along the river and as Wellington's men scrambled on to the
opposite bank the French troops made good their escape and only in a few
places did they remain to dispute the crossing. By the end of the day the
operation to cross the Bidassoa had been a complete success with just
1,200 Allied casualties against 1,700 French. Once across the
Bidassoa and having established his army in France Wellington's next
objective was to clear away the French from their positions in front of
the River Nivelle. Soult's lines stretched from the shores of the Atlantic
on the French right flank to the snow-covered pass of Roncesvalles on the
left while the sixteen miles between the pass of Maya and the sea roughly
followed the line of the Nivelle, thus giving us the battle's name. The line was marked by
a series of hills upon the summits of which the French had constructed
strong redoubts, some containing artillery. These redoubts ran from
Finodetta on the extreme left flank of the French position, to Fort Socoa,
on the coast opposite St Jean de Luz. Although Soult's overall position
grew in strength as he fell back on his base at Bayonne, he did not have
enough men to man the lines in depth and was severely over-stretched, the
twenty miles of front being defended by just 63,000 men. Wellington's
force, on the other hand, numbered 80,000 although 20,000 of these were
Spanish troops, many of whom were as yet untried in battle. Wellington planned to
advance along the whole length of Soult's line but would concentrate his
attack on the centre in particular. Any breakthrough here, or on the
French left flank, would enable his men to swing north and cut off the
French right flank. On the Allied left, Sir John Hope would advance with
the 1st and 5th Divisions and Freire's Spaniards. Beresford would lead the
main Allied attack against the French centre with the 3rd, 4th, 7th and
Light Divisions, while on the Allied right Hill would attack with the 2nd
and 6th Divisions, supported by Morillo's Spaniards and Hamilton's
Portuguese. All preparations for the attack having been made Wellington
decided to attack on November 10th. The French defensive
line was dominated by the Greater Rhune, a gorse-covered, craggy mountain
some 2,800 feet high. The mountain is fairly accessible to anyone on foot,
the rocky spurs only becoming impassable towards the top and on the
eastern side. Separated from the Greater Rhune by a ravine, some 700 yards
below it, is the Lesser Rhune along the precipitous crest of which the
French had constructed three defensive positions. If the French defences
on La Rhune could be taken Soult's position would become very precarious
as his lines would then be open to Allied attacks from different
directions. The summit of the
Greater Rhune was occupied by French troops but, following the crossing of
the Bidassoa and the subsequent clearing of the French from their
positions along the Bayonet Ridge above Vera, they evacuated it, fearing
an outflanking movement that would leave them cut off from their own
forces. Before he could consider attacking the redoubts he first had to
turn his attention to the French defenders along the crest of the Lesser
Rhune. This position was a strong one as the southern face of it could not
be assaulted owing to the precipitous slopes that led to the summit. It
was possible, however, to attack the three fortified positions by moving
down into the ravine before turning to the left which would enable the
attacking force to take the French in their flank and sweep them from the
crest. Wellington chose the Light Division for the task. Shortly before dawn on
November 10th the division carefully picked its way down from the top of
the Greater Rhune and into the ravine in front of the Lesser Rhune. Once
this had been done the men were ordered to lie down and wait for the order
to attack until suddenly, British guns fired from the top of the nearby
Mount Atchubia as the signal for the attack to begin. The men of the 43rd,
52nd and 95th - with the 17th Portuguese Caçadores in support - swept
forward up the steep slopes to assault the French positions that ran along
the crest to flush the defenders from their rocky redoubts. The men were
exhausted by their efforts but the surprise and boldness of their attack
won the day and soon those defenders who had not been killed or taken were
tumbling down the Rhune towards the redoubts atop the hills below. While the 43rd and 95th
were going about their business, there still remained one very strong
star-shaped fort down below on the Mouiz plateau which reached out towards
the coast. This was attacked by Colborne's 52nd Light Infantry, supported
by riflemen from the 95th. Once again, surprise was the key to their
success and as they sprang up from their positions in front of the fort
the startled French defenders, in danger of being cut off, quickly fled
leaving Colborne in possession of the fort and other trenches. It had been
accomplished without hardly a single casualty. Following this
Wellington's main assault began as nine Allied divisions advanced on a
front of five miles, French opposition melting away before them, and when
the bridge at Amotz fell to the 3rd Division - it was the only lateral
communication between the left and right halves of the French army -
Soult's position fell with it. This meant that the Soult's army was
effectively cut in two. By 2 o'clock in the afternoon the French were
defeated and were in full retreat across the Nivelle having lost 4,351 men
to Wellington's 2,450. Napier's verdict on the day was as eloquent and
dramatic as usual. "The plains of France were to be the prize of
battle, and the half-famished soldiers, in their fury, were breaking
through the iron barrier erected by Soult as if it were a screen of
reeds." Wellington might have
pursued the defeated French even further and there was a very real chance
that he might cut off the French right flank. However, darkness was
falling and, never one to risk the perils of a night attack, he called a
halt to the day's proceeding and his men camped that night upon the ground
they had won during the day. |
