2nd Battalion Worcestershire Regiment in Burma 1944-45
CHAPTER 3
THE FIGHTING IN THE IRRAWADDY BRIDGEHEAD
The 1/15th Punjab Regt. can claim the honour of being the first across the Irrawaddy. This unit was officially the “Divisional H.Q. Defence Battalion,” but in practice was employed for all kinds of especial roles and were attached at different times to Brigades as the situation required. On the night of 15/16 January, the Punjabis got two companies across about 3 miles North of Kyaukmyaung and established a small bridgehead on the East bank. The following night, however, both the 5/10 Baluch and the 1/6 Gurkhas crossed and took over the bridgehead, the two companies of Punjabis being withdrawn to the West bank.
There was little opposition to the initial crossing. The enemy appeared to have been taken by surprise. It seemed as though he neither expected us to reach the river so soon after the capture of Shwebo, nor to cross as far North as we did. The more obvious place to have attempted the establishment of the bridgehead in this area was, of course, opposite Kyaukmyaung itself, terminus of the main road from Shwebo and the place from which in peace-time ran the ferry to the East bank at the village of Ngapyin-in. By avoiding the obvious, however, and taking advantage of the extremely thick bamboo jungle that here clothes the slopes on both sides of the Irrawaddy, we had been lucky enough to achieve surprise. The actual crossing place, which was used for the first couple of days, was a most inaccessible spot. It had to be reached by a very poor track running parallel to the West bank and mostly through thick jungle. The bank itself, however, at the spot chosen by the Sappers, was open and suitable for the launching of rafts and assault boats. Opposite on the East bank, steep-sided hills covered with thick bamboo jungle ran right down to the water’s edge. The line of the bank, however, was broken at one point by a small sandy beach, and this formed the other terminus of the crossing. |
Irrawaddy bridgehead |
During the 17th the Jap made two attacks on the bridgehead. Both were successfully beaten off, and that night the first part of the Battalion, and Bde. Tac H.Q., crossed over. “A” Coy., under Capt. Maycock, “C” Coy. under Capt. Morris, who took over from Major Pritchard when the latter was evacuated sick at the beginning of the month, and “D” Coy. under Major Dawe, with a proportion of the Battalion mules, were over by 0130 hrs. on the 18th, all under the command of Major Tipler. Most of that afternoon the Baluch were fighting to enlarge the bridgehead Southwards, while the Gurkhas pushed two companies out East to occupy the commanding feature of Minban Taung. That night the Commanding Officer crossed over with “B” Coy. On the morning of the 19th the rest of the Battalion, except for the M.T. and certain administrative personnel left on the West bank under Capt. Higgins and the Q.M., crossed over under Major Hodder (Leicesters), who had recently joined the Battalion and taken over Second-in-Command.
During the afternoon of the 19th the whole Battalion moved South down the river bank along a most difficult track which in places almost overhung the river and which could hardly be negotiated by mules. Two mules actually did lose their footing and fell into the river and were drowned. We went into a perimeter about a mile downstream, which had been occupied the previous night by the Baluch. Meanwhile the rest of the Gurkhas went to reinforce their two companies on Minban Taung, which were already being heavily attacked. The bridgehead perimeter was taken over by some of the Assam Regt. (Div. Recce. Bn.) and the 1/15 Punjabis.
The Baluch by this time had fought their way further South along the bank and established a perimeter around the deserted village of Ngapyin-in. We joined them on the 20th January, and that night were holding the southern half of what was to become the new bridgehead perimeter. The Baluch occupied the northern portion. As soon as this was done, the small original bridgehead was abandoned, and on the West bank the village of Yedaw, a mile upstream from Kyaukmyaung and much more accessible by road than the original western terminus, was adopted as the landing place for the ferry on that side.
The village of Ngapyin-in was to remain for some time the centre of the Irrawaddy bridgehead. As events turned out, the area immediately around it was to be the scene of heavy fighting both offensive and defensive; of attempts by the Japs to drive us back into the river; of our endeavours to break out South-east towards Mandalay.
From the village starts the only motorable track running South for some distance up and down the East bank. Actually, after wandenng inland for some distance, it strikes the bank again just North of Singu, a small town about the same size as Kyaukmyaung, a steamer station, and the place from which starts the road to Mandalay. To get control of that was, of course, our real object. A glance at the map will show, however, that whereas the good road from Shwebo already existed on the West bank almost to Yedaw, no motorable track ran South down the West bank to the villages facing Singu. It is true that one was developed as soon as possible, but to have attempted to establish a bridgehead at Singu, without having a motorable road to a crossing place opposite to it on the West bank, would have been creating great difficulties. It was not a question of normal supplies. They could be dropped by air. It was a matter of getting guns, vehicles, and the many other pieces of heavy equipment, which could only come by road across into the bridgehead. It followed, therefore, that until such a track were completed, or until all the heavy equipment was over and we could be dependent on the Air only, the bridgehead was bound to remain with its centre in the area opposite the main road from Shwebo.
Minban Taung, which the Gurkhas were holding, was starting to be somewhat of a problem. It is a big feature, and the nearest water is in the chaung just North of the village of Yeshin. This water point was, however, at first held by the Japs, and to start with the Gurkhas fetched all their water from the river in the area of the original bridgehead. It was a long carry and the water parties needed protection as the enemy tried to interfere with them. It became obvious that further problems such as the evacuation of wounded would soon arise unless a line of communication was secured between Minban Taung and the bridgehead at Ngapyin-in. It was not a great distance and either of the two tracks running eastward toward Yeshin would serve the purpose. The Gurkhas, however, had been attacked in their position and it was a question of finding out what opposition lay between them and the bridgehead.
On the 20th January, therefore, when the rest of the Battalion was moving South to join the Baluch at Ngapyin-in, ”D“ Coy. under Major Dawe was ordered to go to a certain track junction which became known as Charing Cross, and lay on the more northerly of the tracks to Yeshin. On arrival there the Company was to form a firm base and patrol eastward. It was to prove merely the first of a series of attempts to reach Yeshin.
The Coy. reached Charing Cross without incident, except that owing to there being several more tracks on the ground than were shown on the map, map reading was found to be extremely difficult. The fact that it was bamboo jungle, through which one could only see about twenty yards, did not make things any easier. It may be mentioned here that the map of this area was proved to be inaccurate in many respects. It was found later, for instance, that the main track to Yeshin did not run as shown, and that the position of certain villages on the map was only approximately correct.
On arrival at Charing Cross a firm base was formed and Coy. H.Q. set up. The platoon patrols that were sent out, however, ran almost immediately into what later proved to be quite an extensive Jap position astride the track. Fighting developed, Major Dawe was wounded, and the leading platoon found itself pinned down by a number of L.M.C. ‘s sited in concealed and well dug-in positions. Lieut. Leak was then wounded in trying to reach other men of his platoon who were wounded and lying out in the open. Eventually the Coy. was able to recover the wounded and disengage. It then withdrew into the bridgehead.
The next day the bridgehead was reinforced by the arrival of the 1/15 Punjabis and a platoon of the M.G. Bn., 11th Sikh Regt., the original bridgehead farther North having been closed down. The Baluch were ordered to get a Company on to a fairly large feature which became known as Pear and which lay about two miles South along the river bank from Ngapyin-in. Meanwhile the Battalion was ordered to find two Companies to go out and clear the road to Yeshin and contact the Gurkhas. The Commanding Officer decided to go out with “A” and “C” Companies himself.
They did not, however, get far. Three to four hundred yards outside the perimeter they ran into fairly strong opposition. “A” Coy., which was leading, came upon what was apparently a party of Japs forming up with the intention of attacking the bridgehead, and estimated to be about a company or more strong. Fighting started. Amongst others, our F.O.O. was wounded, and the Coy. came under mortar and grenade discharger fire. Considerable casualties were, however, inflicted on the enemy, many of whom were down in a chaung below “A” Coy., and 3 Jap machine guns were captured. Nevertheless, when orders were received to withdraw, it took the rest of the morning and the early part of the afternoon to break off the action and get the wounded back inside the perimeter. Lieut. Hudson, of “B” Company, was killed this day. He disappeared down a chaung and was never seen alive again. His body was found two days later surrounded by nine dead Japs.
During that morning, while “A” and “B” Companies were out, heavy shelling started in the bridgehead itself. How many guns were employed was not known, but our Gunners estimated the number at between 40 and 50. Nearly all the shells fell in our Battalion area, and in particular in the mule lines and around Bn. Headquarters. Amongst others, Capt. Morris, of “C” Coy., was seriously wounded. One or two other officers were slightly wounded, although not badly enough to necessitate evacuation. The mule lines were a shambles of dead and dying animals, and about 20 were killed or had to be destroyed. This, as it turned out, was our first taste of the shelling to which we were to be frequently subjected while in the bridgehead.
On 22nd January another attempt was made to get through to the Gurkhas on Minban Taung, this time with Bren Carriers which had been ferried across the river. Lieut. Bailey with six carriers set out to get through along the main track. “B” Coy. stood by to follow him up. The track was, however, found to be quite unsuitable for carriers and the attempt was abandoned without contact being made with the enemy. The carriers would have undoubtedly been ambushed and no useful purpose have been served.
Meanwhile the Baluch sent another Coy. with a platoon of M.M.G. s to reinforce the one that was already on Pear. One Coy. of the Assam Regt. came into the perimeter to reinforce it.
That night a very determined attack was made on the bridgehead perimeter. Very heavy shelling started as dusk was falling, inflicting casualties on both personnel and mules. The Q.M. ‘s staff laying out rations on the river bank for collection by Companies was completely eliminated by one shell. R.Q.M.S. Nash was badly wounded and the rest of his staff either killed or wounded. Lieut. Lockey, the Q.M., and a new staff had to be fetched hurriedly from across the river, where they were with the Admin. “Box.”
Up on the perimeter itself, in the dark bamboo jungle, all hell seemed to have been let loose. Vickers guns were firing belt after belt, D.F. was coming down just beyond the wire, and both sides were using grenades in tremendous quantities. The air was so thick with dust that it was almost impossible to see. It was impossible for the troops on the perimeter to dig in properly owing to the extremely rocky nature of the ground. Stone “sangars” made from large boulders had to be built instead. With the Japs within five or ten yards of the wire firing M.G. ‘s, throwing grenades and attempting to charge home with the bayonet, one would have felt less naked in a deep weapon pit. It is with pride that we record that ours was the only sector of the perimeter that was not broken into that night. Three times the Jap broke through the Punjabis and had to be thrown out with the bayonet. Once he got as far as the Baluch Bn. Headquarters.
Next day, 23rd January, another attempt was made to get through to the Gurkhas, this time by Major Hodder with an E.O.O. and “A” and “B” Companies. It met with no more success than previous efforts. “B” Coy., in the lead, on coming to the spot in the jungle where “D” Coy. had had their small action, ran into exactly the same opposition as had been there previously. The number of wounded started to mount, including Lieut. Potts, and the Coy. was completely held up. Owing to the inaccuracy of the map and the uncertainty of the exact position of the troops, it was not possible to bring down Artillery fire. After a time “B” Coy. were withdrawn slightly and it was decided to work round one of the flanks with “A” Coy. The orders given the column before it started out were that it was to be back inside the perimeter by 1700 hrs., however, and little progress had been made before it was time to start back on the return journey. Reconnaissance revealed, however, that the position held by the enemy was much more extensive than had at first been supposed, covering as it did both tracks running towards Yeshin.
It may be mentioned that fighting or marching through jungle is a slow business. True, this was only bamboo jungle, which is not really dense, growing as it does in clumps about 5 yards apart and allowing visibility of about 20 yards. But the difficulties of map-reading are great. The only safe and sure way is to proceed on a compass bearing with men pacing to check the distance covered. The result is that the whole column goes in single file and is therefore most unwieldy. The leading troops have to proceed with the utmost caution as they are apt to find themselves right on top of an enemy position before they realise it. In addition, owing to the untidy way in which bamboo grows, branches are inclined to get caught up in the loads on the mules’ backs. Easy passage is denied to stretcher-bearers carrying wounded. Their task is often made more difficult by the fact that the ground is often covered with large boulders and intersected with deep-sided ravines. For four men to try to carry a wounded comrade in moderate comfort over such ground is far from easy. It is tiring enough for an unencumbered man. It may be imagined, therefore, that to get a whole column, including mules and wounded, through jungle is a tiring business calling for considerable patience.
By the 24th January the position of 1/6 Gurkhas on Minban Taung was getting desperate. They were practically surrounded and had been repeatedly and heavily attacked. They had wounded who they had been unable to evacuate. They were short of ammunition and food. The R.A.F. pilot of the Dakota, which was just about to drop supplies to them the previous day, had been fired on from the ground by the Jap and wounded. He just managed to reach his base, but without dropping the supplies so urgently needed by the Gurkhas.
Accordingly, the whole Battalion was ordered to go out on the 24th as a relief column to them. The Divisional Commander said that the column must get through if it was humanly possible to do so. As it turned out, this small expedition was completely successful. The Bn. went in two columns, a fighting column consisting of “C” and “A” Coys. under the Commanding Officer with an F.O.O., and a relief column consisting largely of stretcher parties and extra food and ammunition on mules escorted by “B” and “D” Coys. under the Second-in-Command. An early start was made and a new line of advance was tried. Instead of attempting to get through on the track to Yeshin, both columns made their way northwards along the river bank from the bridgehead for about a mile. From there they struck inland on a compass bearing calculated to clear the northern edge of the enemy position astride the approaches to Yeshin. Some slight opposition was met on the way out, but was brushed aside with very minor casualties. The supplies and ammunition were delivered, the Gurkha wounded were collected, and both columns got back to the perimeter by nightfall without further incident.
On the 25th, apart from an air-strike against the Jap position on the Yeshin road, there was little activity. The Bn. rested except for sending out some patrols and dealing, of course, with the usual “Jitter Parties” on the perimeter at night. As usual, also, there was some shelling.
It had been decided that our Bde. should be relieved in the bridgehead by 62 Bde. 98 Bde. was, of course, still away at this time fighting farther North up the Irrawaddy fighting at Kabwet on the West bank, and at Thabeikkyin, where a small subsidiary bridgehead had been formed, and was not available to take part in the fighting in the main bridgehead.
We were the first unit to be relieved. On the 26th we crossed back over the river in the evening and went into a perimeter just South of Yedaw. The next day we took over the positions on the West bank of the river South of Kyaukmyaung, occupied by the 2nd Welch Regt. The Bn. found itself very spread out. “A” Coy. was down at Makauk, “C” Coy. and Bn. H.Q. at Nwenyein. “D” Coy. was with Bde. H.Q. on the main Shwebo road, while “B” Coy. were on their own just South of the main road.
Between the 26th January and the 2nd February, when we re-crossed the river into the bridgehead, the Bn. was supposed to be resting. Owing, however, to patrols which had to be found and other activities, there was not much rest for anyone. The Bn. was rather low in numbers both in officers and men. A platoon was strong if it numbered twenty. Companies were down to about fifty-five in strength. We were glad to see Major Tipler return on the 31st from being sick in hospital, where he had been since shortly after we first crossed int the bridgehead. He took over “B” Coy. and Capt. Whitmore took over “C,” replacing Capt. Morris.
On 30th, “C” Coy. with an F.O.O. went out and moved down South along the bank of the river, through Makauk, and investigated a large feature on which it was reported that the Jap was digging in. He had been seen pissing troops across the river by night, and it was suspected that he would endeavour to send parties N.W. to cut the main road from Shwebo. The Coy. formed a firm base in the jungle and patrolled all over the feature, finding signs of recent occupation but no enemy. They returned without incident on the 31st.
Meanwhile, in the bridgehead across the river there had been furious fighting. On the night of the 29th a more than usually heavy attack was made on Pear, now held by the Rajputana Rifles. Pear was directly opposite the Bn. H.Q. position at Nwenyein, and that night those of us in it got no sleep; apart from the noise we got a proportion of the “overs.” On the night of the 30th a very determined attempt was launched against the bridgehead in addition to the usual attack on Pear. Again we got no sleep and again we got a share of the “overs.” 1/6 Gurkhas, who were relieved by the Welch, had the greatest difficulty in getting back inside the bridgehead. They found their way barred by the Jap and fought all one day without getting through, sustaining considerable casualties. They formed a perimeter for the night in the jungle and arrived in the bridgehead next day.
On the 1st February we left our positions South of Kyaukmyaung and changed places with the Baluch, who were in a position near the main Shewbo road. Next day, starting at 1400 hrs., we re-crossed the Irrawaddy into the bridgehead, coming under command of 62 Bde. It was decided that we should take over Pear from the Rajputana Rifles. As our Companies were so weak, however, it was realised that the whole Battalion would be needed to hold the feature. The Baluch and the Rajputana Rifles, who had held it up to the present, being much stronger in numbers, had never had more than two Companies there.
“B” and “D” Companies, the latter now commanded by Capt. Ellis, therefore, on the 3rd February started off under the Second-in-Command, and relieved one Coy. of the Rajputana Rifles. The remainder of the Battalion, less certain portions of H.Q. Coy., who remained behind in the bridgehead, arrived under the Commanding Officer the following morning and completed the relief.
We were only on Pear until the morning of the 7th February, and’ generally speaking, had an easy time compared to the other two units who had been there before us. By the time we arrived, however, the importance of this feature had grown to such an extent that it was regarded as no less than a XIV Army commitment, which had to be held at any cost. No account of the fighting in the Irrawaddy bridgehead would be complete without a short description of it.
Pear is a big rocky feature, getting its name from its shape, the lower slopes of which are covered in fairly thick bamboo jungle thinning away towards the top, which has only a few stunted trees on it. There is no water nearer than the river 500 ft. below. On the top at the southern end were two pagodas, which formed the most admirable, ranging marks for enemy artillery. It owed its importance to its dominating position. Not only did it give good observation up and down the river for a considerable distance, but whoever was in occupation of it could see any movement in the country for miles around. It was not to be wondered at that the Jap, realising its importance too late, had tried repeatedly to drive us off it. The top, which has two terraces, is fairly flat and little more than 200 yards long. It was round the lower of these two terraces that the perimeter ran.
There were no less than ten F.O.O. ‘s and flash-spotting Gunner officers in occupation when we arrived, all controlled by a “Master Gunner.” The whole hill was ringed by S.O.S. tasks, which could be asked for individually according to where an attack was expected to be coming in, or collectively on the Code word “PIG.” It had been found by experience that unless the S.O.S. came down quickly when asked for, the Jap got inside between it and the wire. As a result, the Gunners had reduced things to a fine art. Not only did they bring their fire down so close that everyone had to keep his head very well down indeed in his hole, but they answered the call for fire in literally about 10 seconds. “PIG” when it came down was such a frightening affair that no one, even in the worst Jap attack, had ever dared to ask for more than half of it at a time. The garrison was supplied by air drop in the middle of the perimeter. As the area was very small, everyone had to take cover while a “drop” was on, and when they emerged to collect it they were invariably shelled. Being shelled on Pear was far from pleasant.
Owing to the nature of the ground, which was almost solid rock, stone “sangars” had to be built up instead of digging trenches. Splinters flew in all directions when shelling took place. For the same reason it was impossible to bury the dead properly. One merely covered them with piles of boulders and used quicklime. Whilst we were generally able, however, to recover our dead except for men lost on patrol, the Japs could not recover the large numbers of theirs who were killed in attacks at night on the perimeter, and they were left to rot where they lay, mostly in the jungle just out of sight of the perimeter over the crest of the hill, but at no great distance from it. With the hot sun beating down on the rocky surface, the stench was almost unbearable. It can be imagined that Pear was not a pleasant spot.
While the Battalion was on Pear, there were the usual Jitter Parties by night and a certain amount of shelling, including shelling of our water party on the river bank. There was, however, no really heavy attack. Lieut. Price, of “D” Coy., unfortunately died on the 5th February from wounds received when out on patrol round the southern slopes that morning. Apart from him, however, there were only one or two minor casualties. These were evacuated by boat from the river bank at a point where an under-feature known as TIT existed, and which was garrisoned by “A” Coy. under Capt. Maycock Evacuation of casualties by land was too risky as the Japs were apt to lay strong ambushes on the track from the bridgehead to Pear, which were difficult to avoid and troublesome to dislodge.
On the 3rd February, another effort was made to gain control of the road from the bridgehead to Yeshin. The Bde. Commander of 62 Bde., with 4/6 Gurkhas and a squadron of tanks which had been brought across the river, set out along the main track. The Jap waited until they reached Yeshin and then brought down very heavy and accurate shellfire on them. The Gurkhas suffered some 160 casualties and also lost most of their mules. The column returned to the bridgehead next day.
By this time a dust track had been completed from a point about two miles West of Kyaukmyaung on the main Shwebo road down to Shwedaik on the West bank opposite Kule, a village below the Southern end of Pear. If Kule and the ridges to the East of it could be captured, the bridgehead could be extended southward nearer to the Mandalay road running from Singu, a ‘new crossing place over the river could be established between Shwedaik and Kule, and it might be possible to avoid using the Yeshin route to Singu, which had proved such a difficult task to gain control of.
An operation to capture Kule was accordingly planned, and the Battalion would have the task of capturing it.